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LIBERAL EDUCATION, THE CASE-SYSTEM,
AND JURISPRUDENCE*
HAmY KALVE, JR.t
On my conscience, I have spoken prose above these forty years, without knowing
anything of the matter; and I have all the obligations in the world to you, for in-
forming me of this.-MoL&Pl , Le Bourgeois Gentilhonne.
T IS the purpose of this paper to outline tentatively the kind of course
in jurisprudence that might result from a conscious adaptation of
some traditional techniques of liberal education to the needs of the
modern law school, and to evaluate briefly the contribution such a course
might make toward a solution of some of the recurring problems in teach-
ing the general content of law.
The traditional techniques of liberal education have in recent years
been the subject of considerable publicity under the label "The Great
Books," and the theme therefore is, in a sense, the relation of "The Great
Books" and jurisprudence. "The Great Books" label is, however, an un-
fortunate and misleading one. Because of its connotation of a rigid list of
"One Hundred Great Books" against which everyone else's education can
be measured, it has almost invited the ignoring of the values in the educa-
tional theory behind it.
"Jurisprudence," too, is a bad term today. It suggests strongly that
part of law in which no one is interested and it has a singularly cold, dead,
and pompous sound to the modern ear. Perhaps it was given the kiss of
death when Professor Llewellyn coined that noun, jurisprde.
A proposal, then, to combine "The Great Books" and jurisprudence
cannot but sound unattractive. I shall therefore attempt to take the curse
off the vocabulary by the familiar expedient of redefining the key terms.
I
I shall start with "The Great Books." Properly understood it is the doc-
trine of liberal education, and as such it has something to say about both
content and method, although perhaps more about the latter than the
former. The best prospectus for it that I know of is to be found in a slender
* The substance of this paper was read before the Jurisprudence and Legal Histoy round
table at the Association of American Law Schools meeting December 27, 1946, in Chicago.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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book by Mark Van Doren" entitled Liberal Education and published in
19432
Mr. Van Doren warns us that he will not say much that is new and in-
deed many of his points are familiar and easy to accept. We are told that
no one thinks he is well educated today, but that a dip into history shows
that men have always expressed dissatisfaction with existing standards of
education. We are told that a large burden of education must remain on
the stt~dent's shoulders and that the good teacher is always teaching him-
self. We are told that education without intellectual design is intolerable
and that much education is in that state today. We are reminded with elo-
quence of the intimate relation between education and democracy and
that democracy cannot have too many men educated as well as possible.
And we are admonished not to expect too much of education alone; not,
that is, on the one hand to expect her to solve all the world's problems or
on the other, singlehanded to make us moral men.
We are also given a series of striking characterizations of the liberally
educated man-he has a disciplined yet free mind; he has somehow been
mademore human; he, in a phrase Van Doren borrows from Pascal, "be-
x Popularized statements of the'program are to be found, among other places, in Adler,
How to Read a Book (i94o); Adler, Manual for Discussion Leaders (Prelim. Draft, x946); in
connection with the application to law school it may be of interest to compare Hutchins,
Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. Sii (1934). On the popular maga-
zine level see, for example, Hill, A Business Man Views the Classics, American Mercury
(Aug., 1945).
2 Although the program has been much discussed, it has not been widely adopted. The only
school I know which fully incorporates this program is, or was, St. John's College, Annapolis,
and it has had, I believe, less than fifteen years of experience with it. The only other proposal
I know that is centered on this approach is the experiment in a full curriculum for adult educa-
tion started this fall by the Downtown College of the University of Chicago. Courses which
reflect some of this emphasis have from time to time been given at the University of Chicago,
particularly under the auspices of Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer Adler. The original
impetus to the program appears to have come from Columbia University under the sponsor-
ship of John Erskine and Everett Dean Martin. Educators such as Scott Buchanan and String-
fellow Barr have also been particularly active on its behalf in recent years. There is, in addition,
a project under way in connection with the Encyclopedia Britannica to reprint a series of
books together with a detailed analytical index and commentary.
One other bit of data is worth noting. The greatest success and popularity of the idea in re-
cent years has been in the field of adult education. I am told that this year over eight hundred
adults are taking such courses in connection with the Downtown College of the University
of Chicago. Perhaps more impressive than these classes, which utilize, in general, university
teaching personnel, are the so-called community groups which meet on a purely. voluntary
basis in neighborhood libraries, churches or homes and use non-professional teachers. This
program is expanding rapidly and recent reports show some sixty classes scattered throughout
Chicago with approximately twenty-four hundred students, and another eighty classes in
Cleveland, Detroit, and Indianapolis with some twenty-five hundred students. There are
plans to extend the program by next fall to Seattle, Portland, Tacoma, and Vancouver.
Perhaps the most arresting variant is a class which for several years has been conducted at
the Stewart-Warner plant in Indianapolis for plant workers.
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lieves and doubts well"; his activities have relish for him. He can even
fight evil without illusion it will stay away, and can look forward to
serenity in old age.
And then in a particularly effective passage Van Doren tells us:
The student who can begin early in his life to think of things as connected, even if he
revises his view with every succeeding year, has begun the life of learning. The experi-
ence of learning is the experience of having one part of the mind teach another, of
understanding suddenly that this is that under an aspect hitherto unseen, of accumu-
lating, at an ever-accelerated rate, the light that is generated whenever ideas con-
verge. Nothing that can happen to men is more delightful than this, and it is a pity
when it does not happen to them as students. To all but a few students today it
cannot happen. There are gaps or breaks for them, as for their professors, between
poetry and mathematics, between science and ethics, between philosophy and politics;
their advance through these "subjects" is not on a single front; they do not study pro-
portion as something equally present in arithmetic, in geometry, in architecture, in
music, in physics, in the human body, and in poetry where its name is metaphor; they
do not study form as something common to mathematics, metaphysics, and morals;
they do not study tragedy as a process in ideas parallel to the course of calamity in
the lives of persons. If they did, their leisure hours-so necessary to the studious
career-might themselves possess a center, and the work unconsciously done in idle-
ness might have results worth waiting for.3
From the book as a whole five things emerge as most distinctively char-
acterizing Van Doren's position:
(i) Liberal education is not a specialty. It is the common core of educa-
tion which all men should have and share, particularly in a democracy.
(2) Liberal education is the proper preparation for becoming a special-
ist. "The specialist," he says, "is the fine end of education." But it Would
appear that the specialist is not only the graduate student or professional
man, but in a sense any man with a calling or a vocation.
(3) Liberal education involves mastery of certain basic intellectual
techniques or disciplines which Van Doren likes to call the liberal arts.
(4) Liberal education uses tradition critically, but emphasizes the con-
temporaneity of some traditional materials and warns that we will have
tradition still with us even if we try to ignore it. The liberally educated
man has settled a relation in his mind between past and present.
(5) Science and literature are partners in liberal education. Mr. Van
Doren is singularly insistent on this point and devotes an enjoyable chap-
ter to unsparing criticism of the classics, English letters, and even the hu-
manities as these are taught today. Science, he would emphasize, is liberal
and humane; literature, he would equally emphasize, is disciplined and
rigorous. And no education is complete or liberal if it has one without the
'Van Doren, Liberal Education 115-6 (1943).
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other. The liberally educated man has settled a relation in his mind be-
tween literature and science.4
We come then to the actual pattern of the educational process and
finally meet up with the books. Van Doren can put the program into a few
sentences:
.... the curriculum for any college may be simply described. The four years of
every student will be devoted to two principal and simultaneous activities: learning
the arts of investigation, discovery, criticism, and communication, and achieving at
first hand an acquaintance with the original books, the unkillable classics, in which
these miracles have happened .....
Neither activity is conceivable without the other.5
We see then the books in perspective as part, albeit a central one, of
a college curriculum which envisages intensive laboratory work in experi-
mental science, and training in languages and mathematics as co-ordinate
aspects of the process. And if we examine Mr. Van Doren's list of books
we discover no less than forty selections out of the total one hundred ten
deal with works in the physical and biological sciences.6
Mr. Van Doren has one further corollary which follows froni his theories
-in the good school all teachers would teach interchangeably all courses.
No one, remember, is a specialist in liberal education.
II
There are, I know, objections to this program entirely apart from its
possible relevance to law schools, but I suggest postponing a considera-
tion of difficulties until the scheme is applied to law schools. At that point
the general difficulties should appear in a more virulent form.
4 There is relevance at this point in an extended quotation which Van Doren takes from
Scott Buchanan on mathematics: " 'It is true that mathematics sometimes deals with rigid
structures, chains, and networks, but they are not made of propositions, and long and elaborate
arguments are most often bad mathematics. The structures with which mathematics deals are
more like lace, the leaves of trees, and the play of light and shadow on a meadow or a human face,
than they are like buildings and machines, the least of their representatives. The best proofs
in mathematics are short and crisp like epigrams, and'the longest have swings and rhythms
that are like music. The structures of mathematics and the propositions about them are ways
for the imagination to travel and the wings, or legs, or vehicles to take you where you want to
go. The solemn sound of demonstrated mathematical truths is a professional way of announcing
an arrival at some point on the journey fantastic. Let it be added for good measure that some
of the greatest mathematical discoveries by the greatest mathematical minds have been
theorems that they could not prove; some have never been proved. The fact of the matter is
that anything worth discovoring in mathematics does not need proof; it needs only to be seen
or understood.' "Van Doren, op. cit. supra note 3, at 134-35.
5 Ibid., at i44-45.
6The names are worth noting: Hippocrates, Aristarchus, Archimedes, Euclid,
Apollonius, Nichomachus, Ptolemy, Galen, Leonardo, Copernicus, Gilbert, Bacon, Kepler,
Harvey, Galileo; Descartes, Boyle, Newton, Huygens, Lavoisier, Dalton, Fourier, Lobachevski,
Faraday, Peacock, Virchow, Darwin, Bernard, Mendel, Riemann, Dedekind, Maxwell,
joule, James, Freud, Cantor, Hilbert, Poincar6, Russell, Veblen, and Young. The list'appears
in Van Doren, op. cit. supra note 3, at 151-52.
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It is time, then, for the other key term-"jurisprudence." I suggest it
be used here to cover simply the basic problems and assumptions of law.
Its field is simply the good and profitable basic or general questions one
can ask about law, however many or few there may be. Its concern then is
with whatever we talk about when we talk about law in terms that apply
to more than one field of positive law.
This may begin to have a vacuous sound. We do not like Law with a
capital "L" any more than we do jurisprudence. There is, however, one
way in which it can readily be made more concrete. To a large degree
jurisprudence deals with the kinds of questions a curriculum committee
must have asked itself in designing the curriculum. If we would reply that
no man can see law steadily and see it whole, let us recall that we must
at least be trying to do something like that when we design the curriculum.
And designing and redesigning law curricula has been a popular activity
in recent years. One shorthand way, then, of talking about a course in
jurisprudence is to say that it should approximate what would happen
if we were critically to re-evaluate our curriculum each year and to per-
mit our students to participate in the discussion.
There is perhaps another way of talking about it which Mr. Van Doren
has suggested-and it should become apparent how carefully I am loading
my key terms. Jurisprudence is the part of law that all intelligent laymen
can know and understand without thereby becoming lawyers. It is the
juncture at which the specialty merges into the common knowledge of
men. It is, in brief, the liberal education component of law. This is not an
altogether strange view. It is a frequent notion today that a man who tru-
ly understands his specialty can truly popularize it, that is, communicate
something of it to the non-specialist. And we all know hard-headed law-
yers who follow the practice of consulting their wives on tough and intri-
cate cases.
Note, however, that no one would recommend teaching law only in this
aspect to lawyers. The lawyer is to be a specialist and he is still to know a
great deal more of his field than the layman. Jurisprudence at its best is
never more than a part of the education of the specialist. Neither was
Van Doren's liberal education.
There are perhaps four familiar problems of contemporary legal life
that we should particularly keep our eye on. The first is the difficulty of
communication between law faculties and other faculties, especially in
the social sciences. The second is the difficulty of communication between
members of a given law faculty, each of whom is today almost forced to
become a specialist in a few fields. The third is the state of mind of the
senior law student who has now had his two or three years of detail and
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who has become increasingly disenchanted with his prospective life-work.
And I would suggest that the fourth is this same student ten or fifteen
years later.
Now it is not suggested that a good course in jurisprudence will magi-
cally solve these problems, but I think it will make some inroads on them,
and I think that is its main job, and that that is the way it should be
tested.
This again is an old story. Professors Patterson and Llewellyn in their
proposal some years ago for a required third-year course in jurisprudence
said the same thing and said it better. Here is Professor Llewellyn's dosing
statement:
In sum, then, a compulsory third-year special course in Jurisprudence seems to me
an obligation we owe to every man who is to be a lawyer. That he may try on his own,
to make what he has been doing, and what he is to do, take on meaning, as a Whole.
That he may enter into recognition that his profession is not apart from life, a thing
of drudgery, but a part of life, a thing of eternal service. That law may regain for
him its rightful status as a liberal art, as a humanity, as the very focus and balance-
wheel of men's lives together.7
III
So much then for "The Great Books" alone and for jurisprudence
alone. It is time for the wedding.
It is as you might expect a simple ceremony. A course in jurisprudence
should utilize those materials which will best raise the best common ques-
tions about law and best realize the liberal-education component in law.
Some of those materials are traditional; some are not.
The proposal then is for a senior course running throughout the last
year, meeting perhaps as a two-hour seminar twice a month. The students
would read perhaps a dozen books and would devote one or more sessions
to a discussion of each. The classes would be kept down to seminar size,
that is, twenty to twenty-five students at most. It would be a required
course for all seniors. All members of the faculty would participate equally
in teaching it.
One somewhat special feature of the seminar would be the use of two
leaders rather than one. "The Great Books" people have adopted this de-
vice perhaps partly to get as far away from the lecture method as possible,
partly to bring greater energr to the discussion, and partly to give it great-
er flexibility. In any event the scheme works very well in practice. 8
7 Patterson and Lewellyn, A Required Course in Jurisprudence, 9 Am. L. School Rev. 582,
593 (1939).
8 There is some explicit discussion of the reasons for the device and some rules of thumb for
leader co-operation in Adler, Manual for Discussion Leaders (Prelim. Draft, 1946).
220
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Under the best circumstances the course would be conducted jointly
with the other social science departments and perhaps half the students
in a given class would be graduate students in sociology, economics, an-
thropology, political science, psychology, and philosophy.
The efficacy of such a proposal obviously turns on considerations of
both method and content.
The method is simply that of rigorous discussion in small groups. It is
the method first and perhaps best used by Socrates. It is the method in
which Mr. Van Doren is fond of saying the liberal arts of logic, rhetoric,
and grammar come into play on a worthy subject, or if you prefer the
more contemporary usage, it is the good exercise in semantics. It is the
method, in short, of the case-system. And no less a critic of law schools
than Robert Maynard Hutchins has said that they are the only places in
university life today where the liberal arts are really practiced.
The parallel between the case-method and "The Great Books" method
is striking. In each the materials are used to raise the best questions the
topic permits. In each the procedure is intensely dialectical-the articu-
lating and critically examining assumptions and the exploring of them to
see where they lead; in each the procedure is the repartee of question and
answer. And in each there is emphasis on two other things: reading orig-
inals rather than secondary comments about them and reading them
whole rather than by excerpt, although the modern case-book is begin-
ning to look quizzically at these two.
Nothing has been said as yet as to what would be read and discussed,
except that some of the books would be old. I should prefer holding spe-
cific suggestions as to content until we have first looked at some of the
many objections and difficulties in the proposal as outlined thus far.
Remember, however, that the purpose of such a course is not cultural.
It is not to giire the student a veneer of erudition or to enable him to quote
Alice in Wonderland or Oliver Wendell Holmes in the peroration of a
brief or in an after-dinner speech. Its purpose is to give him additional and
necessary insights into his specialty and unless it can do so it has no place
in a law school.
IV
Some objections are objections to any course in jurisprudence in a law
school; others are objections to the particular proposal. We shall look to
each briefly in turn.
Professors Patterson and Llewellyn have already argued the case on
the first grounds in their defense of a required third-year course, and to my
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mind argued it most convincingly. So the job is much- easier on this
score.
The first objection is that there is not time enough. That would be bet-
ter stated as an objection to the utility of examining the general assump-
tions of our field of study. For if such an examination would enable the
student in some degree to see law as a Whole, in Professor Llewellyn's
phrase, there must be time for it. We have it is true only so much of the,
student's life, and lack of time would be a good answer to a proposal to
teach Shakespeare in law school. But it is another matter to say we lack
time to do something integral to a good education in law. Mr. Van Doren
frequently consults an imaginary layman in his book for advice on educa-
'tion. On this point I would suggest we consult the lawyer who has been
out for, say, ten years and who has forgotten some of his law. He would, I
think, tell us that he now realizes that we have plenty of time-in law
school.
There is a variant on the time theme that is more compelling. It was, I
believe, Professor McDougal's point in reviewing Professor Fuller's book.9
The point is that we have so many urgent social problems clamoring for
action which we can all see and grasp that we cannot afford to divert our
time and energy to more speculative matters. If that were the choice, -I
think we would all vote with Professor McDougal. But no proposal has
been made that we speculate about the foundations of law for the next
twenty years and then act. The suggestion simply is that the man of ac-
tion and the specialist will both act better if they frequently, but not in-
cessantly, pause to inquire about what they are doing.
I do not suppose, however, that this is what Professor McDougal really
meant. He was perhaps voicing the age-old skepticism of the inaction of
philosophers. The planners, as Mr. Thurman Arnold has put it, never do.
This is, therefore, an appropriate place to note that the University of Chi-
cago Law School has been working for the past year on the activating of
an institute for legal research. The plans call for a full time staff of law-
yers and economists and other social scientists working seriously on con-
temporary problems and making available relevant social and economic
data and techniques for legal action and education. A start has been made
in that direction on housing.
Another line of objection is that this may be a good thing but that it is
9 McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 5o Yale L. J. 827
(1941). The more recent Lasswell-McDougal prospectus for legal education nods to the im-
portance of attempts to "legitimize democratic values" and contemplates a basic seminar on
ideology. Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy; Professional Training
in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L. J. 203 (1943).
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not the law school's job to cure all the defects in the student's prior edu-
cation. In brief this is education the student should have received before
he came to the law school. Recently I participated in some discussions on
the desirability of using a general education test as a way of selecting ap-
plicants for admission to law school. The education people kept asking
if we were not interested in general education and insisting that if we
were interested we would surely use the test. We decided, however, that it
was not the law school's job to attempt to improve the general education
of its applicants, however desirable that might be. I do not think that
conflicts with the position here. If the Shakespeare course were being sug-
gested again, the appropriate reply would be that it is too late to correct
that educational deficiency in law school and that many a lawyer who
knows no Shakespeare will in all probability be a better lawyer than many
a lawyer who does. The proposal here stands or falls on its being integral
to a complete education in law and on hypothesis it could not have been
done earlier because it requires that the student come t6 it with a consider-
able knowledge of the detail of law.
This is also the point to the insistence of Professors Llewellyn and Pat-
terson that their course be third-year rather than first. The course to be
most effective must capitalize on the data the student has acquired. It is
the re-examination of basic assumptions in the light of so much that is
special and concrete that is the job.
It is another of Mr. Van Doren's points that the good books are infinite-
ly re-readable. Hence, repetition here is not wasteful but necessary. And
this is not to say that anything worth doing once is worth doing twice.
Thus, the examination of these materials as an undergraduate or as a
first-year law student, however useful, is not the same as their examina-
tion by the well-informed student specialist of the third year.
Nor is this to say that the problem of orienting or introducing the new
student to law is not a serious one and that such general discussions are
not most valuable in this connection.o I will not pass on the difficult
choice of whether it be better to have the student meet law by seeing it
whole at the start of his legal education or better to have him put to-
gether what he has amassed so as to see it whole at the end of his legal
education. I think it is rather clear he should have a chance to do both.
The final objection on this level is that such discussion is really im-
possible; that necessarily it will have climbed so high that its abstractions
10 At the University of Chicago Law School there is a basic first-year course in Elements of
the Law. There has also been in recent years increased emphasis on individual research in the
first year which shows promise as a complementary method for introducing the first-year
student to law.
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will have lost meaning and it will therefore be reduced to a verbal exer-
cise. This is, I suppose, the objection that Professor Underhill Moore made
so effectively some twenty years ago to Wigmore's Rational Basis of Legal
Institutions." It is an excellent objection. But there is a stubborn difficulty
with it-at what level do generalizations about law cease to be valuable
and analogies become too thin? It is surely possible to undergeneralize or
analogize. Unless the curriculum has been so designed as to realize ex-
plicitly in its various courses the maximum useful generalizations and
analogies of which law permits, there remains the problem of finding a
vehicle for doing this.
We turn then to some specific objections which can be levied against the
particular proposal rather than against a separate treatment of jurispru-
dence as such.
First of all, why not the lecture method here? We have the classic ex-
ample of Dean Roscoe Pound's lectures at Harvard, and we find Professor
Patterson in his otherwise excellent proposal indicating a preference for
the lecture method as "more economical and more conducive to good
synthesis." It seems to me a little ironic that it may be the jurisprudence
courses where the virtues of the case method are perhaps least often
found. The case against lectures here is essentially the same as the case
against them elsewhere in the law curriculum. No matter how skilfully
composed, they permit the student to be too passive and they give him the
synthesis too soon. Professor Mortimer Adler has said that it is difficult to
justify giving a lecture rather than writing a book or article; that the lec-
ture is in effect simply reading the book or article aloud. I think he has
a point, although it should be added that Professor Adler is still very
active in giving lectures.
A second objection goes to the apparent preference for few and rela-
tively complete materials as against the anthology of which Professor
Hall has given us so good an example." Why, in fact, is not Professor
Hall's compilation closer to the ideal of the case-system? There are at
least two difficulties with this approach. The one has to do with the neces-
sity for quoting out of context. The job of fairly editing such materials is
probably impossible, and there was striking unanimity in the reviews of
Professor Hall that the editing had been too severe, and each reviewer had
a different set of examples to cite.' 3 The other difficulty has to do with the
Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 Col. L. Rev. 6og (1923).
= Hall, Readings in Jurisprudence (1938).
X3 See, e.g., Fuller, book review, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 625 (1939); Konvitz, book review,
49 Yale L.J. 16o (1939); McDougal, book review, 34 111. L. Rev. io9 (x939).
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effect on the student. A large collection of purple passages from good and
great writers, no matter how carefully selectet and arranged, is likely to
give the student a sense of bewildering detail again and an attack of in-
tellectual indigestion. I have a hunch, too, that it is the reading of a single
complex exposition in whole or at least in large units that most closely
parallels the process of the case-system, and it is the smaller parts of such
exposition that may be truly analogous to the cases themselves.
We come then to the proposal that all members of the law faculty teach
the course interchangeably. This, oddly enough, appears to me to be the
key to the whole enterprise and I am tempted to say that if the entire
faculty takes over the course in jurisprudence, I am rather sure the de-
tails of this course will work out satisfactorily regardless of the precise
pattern. The objection here, I take it, is that all members of the faculty
are by no means equally equipped to do this and that they will not be un-
less they devote a prohibitive amount of time and energy to it.
The answer has already been suggested. They already have the method
and they are not expected to have mastered the content. The insight that
the tradition of liberal education can give us here is a simple one. It is that
this is the one field of law in which all law teachers have an equal stake.
And it is that part of law about which the professional specialist can and
perhaps always should be an amateur. Some faculty men will perhaps do
this sort of thing better than others, but the experience suggests that all
will do it well enough.'4
There is one other assumption of Mr. Van Doren that further clarifies
this point, It is that the good books themselves are the teachers, and the
teacher is the mediator between book and student. The books themselves,
he insists, carry a large part of the teaching load. It is clear that here we
part company with the case method to some extent, but it has been sug-
gested that Langdell at least contemplated reading relatively few cases
and reading them well, and it would perhaps not strain the analogy too
much to say that his was "The Great Case" method.
The next objection has a familiar ring. It is that the prospectus by its
emphasis on tradition and the past involves the great waste of dwelling on
obsolete materials out of tune with the contemporary world. This is a
difficult point to debate sensibly. It is easy to talk about "provincialism in
14 During the last year at least six of the members of our law faculty at the University of
Chicago participated, without casualties, as leaders in University Great Books classes, and some
of the books were as remote from law as Hamlet. The University Downtown College reports
that of its forty-one teachers of The Great Books this year, nine are lawyers, fifteen business-
men, three scientists, and one a newspaper columnist; and that in the community groups there
are at least lifty lawyers acting as group discussion leaders.
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time" or "priests of change" as even the usually mellow Mr. Van Doren
does. It is easy to ask just when in time a book becomes obsolete-after
five years, ten years, one hundred years, or when? And it is easy to chal-
lenge the critic on the grounds that he has not read the books he insists
are not worth reading. I do not propose to solve the problem except to say
that we must work out some relation between past and present which
does not ignore the past or the present entirely. 5
I will not conceal where my sympathies lie in the matter and therefore
I cannot resist a quotation from C. S. Lewis' engaging Screwtape Letters.
The letters are being written by an undersecretary in the hierarchy below
to a young fiend and are letters of counsel on how best to achieve success
in the chosen field. Remember that this is the devil speaking:
Only the learned read old books and we have now so dealt with the learned that
they are of all men the least likely to acquire wyisdom by doing so. We have done this
by inculcating The Historical Point of View. The Historical Point of View, put
briefly, means that when a learned man is presented with any statement in an ancient
author, the one question he never asks is whether it is true. He asks who influenced
the ancient writer, and how far the statement is consistent with what he said in other
books, and what phase in the writer's development, or in the general history of thought,
it illustrates, and how it affected later writers, and how often it has been misunder-
stood (specially by the learned man's own colleagues) and what the general course of
criticism on it has been for the last ten years, and what is the "present state of the
question." To regard the ancient writer as a possible source of knowledge-to antici-
pate that what he said could possibly modify your thoughts or your behaviour-this
would be rejected as unutterably simple-minded. And since we cannot deceive the
whole human race all the time, it is most important thus to cut every generation off
from all others; for where learning makes a free commerce between the ages there is
always the danger that the characteristic errors of one may be corrected by the
characteristictruths of another.' 6
There is a variant on this objection which is perhaps more challenging.
It is not that the old books are invariably inapplicable today, but that
they are relatively inaccessible to the modern reader. And if the choice is
between inaccessible profundity of the past and accessible mediocrity of
the present it is not an easy one to make. It is true that many of the old
books, such as those by Plato, are remarkably readable today and this
fact is borne out by the experience with the adult education program. It
is also true, however, that some such as those by Aquinas or Spinoza
sound strange indeed to the modern ear. Some years ago there was a
IS I would suggest, however, that anyone who is firmly convinced that old books are for
antiquarians only at least try a small sampling of some of the oldest and read Aristophanes'
Lysistrata, or Callicles' tirade against Socrates in Plato's Gorgias, or the Melian episode in
Thucydides' History. I need not add that these are hand-picked examples.
z6 Lewis, Screwtape Letters 139-40 (1943).
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popular jingle around the University of Chicago that had the pertinent
refrain:
Nobody knows what Aristotle meant,
Nobody knows but Adler.
We come finally to the last of the objections-that somehow this pro-
gram has an authoritarian and non-democratic bias. Those are, of course,
fighting words, and I find the case for them pretty weak. The proposal, re-
member, is not that we read only Aristotle or only Aquinas, and it must
be noted that the proposal carries two great safeguards against dogma-
tism. The first is the method, which is intensely dialectical and critical.
The second is that by taking from the whole range of man's thinking on
the matter you force the student to recognize and understand the variety
of mankind's views.' 7 It is an old saying that men must at least have a
common topic of discourse before they can disagree.
V
It is inevitable that in an enterprise of this sort the book-list finally
rears its ugly head. The listing of books beyond a certain point becomes
exactly parallel to discussions as to whether Lajoie, Collins, Frisch,
Hornsby, or Gehringer was the best of the second basemen.' 8 It is fun pre-
cisely because it provides material for inherently endless debate.
However, there are better and worse books as there are better and worse
second basemen, and the suggested proposal needs to be further particu-
larized. In what follows I ask that the words of Professor Rodell in his re-
cent and unkind survey of the Harvard book list for prospective law
students be kept in mind:
To criticize any list of books put together for any purpose is something like shooting
a sitting bird. It is not quite sporting, for any fool can do it.19
It should be noted that if we go by books rather than points we will get
an overlap but not a complete one between any two or more books in the
series. A single book, say Aristotle's Ethics, will have several companions
on each of several points and in this sense there is one further analogy to
the case method.
'7 Perhaps "The Great Books" label is the culprit again. It may suggest to some that only
those books are "Great" which agree on all points with the views of the compiler of the list. A
brief survey of the variety of Mr. Van Doren's list, for example, would quickly make evident
the misconception.
Is Or Martin Marion.
'9 Rodell, book review, 54 Yale L. J. 89y, 898 (r945).
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I shall assume that a certain number of basic books will be included.
That is, say four to six from a list which includes: Plato, Aristotle, Aqui-
nas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Spinoza, Kant, Mill, Ben-
tham and Austin. It is clear that these will raise a duster of questions as
to justice and the normative in law, the function of the state, revolution
and civil disobedience, the definition of law, change and stability, equity,
court and legislature, laws and men, freedom and democracy.
And, let me hasten to add, the list should include at least two from the
following incomplete list: Holmes, Brandeis, Dewey, Cohen, Cardozo,
Stone, Pound, Frank, Arnold, Cook, Douglas, Kelsen, Llewellyn, Hall,
McDougal, and Fuller.
Let us turn for the moment to a completely non-legal book. I would in-
clude at least one great work in the physical or biological sciences. Per-
haps Galileo, Newton, Harvey, Lavoisier, Faraday, or Poincar6. However,
any great scientific work might lend itself to a rich comparison to legal
method and to the structure of law and would perhaps allay some of the
suspicions of lawyers that their own intellectual methods are altogether
queer and invalid.
And I would also like to include a book such as Professor Elton Mayo's
recent Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization which is a serious at-
tempt to apply an exacting experimental method to some social problems.
If one had time it would further be useful to read a good statement of
law in some field, perhaps some Williston or Wigmore; or perhaps some-
thing somewhat different such as the late Henry Simons' Personal Income
Taxation. Conceivably, even one of the Restatements would be illuminat-
ing in this connection.
So much then for one aspect of structure and method. Another line
might center on a serious reading of Marx to focus the basic issues of
economic justice, private property, and a competitive society.
And, of course, there should be some good example of legal history, per-
haps some Maitland, Pollock, or Holdsworth.
.Again it might be refreshing to pause and seriously read the Constitu-
tion as a single document, or perhaps read it parallel to the new French
Constitution.
And again something, perhaps Grotius, perhaps E. B. White, would
raise the international issues, or use might be made of materials from
Nuremberg.
To again shift ground, there might be a serious reading of Freud along
with one of these: Aristotle's Ethics, Mill's Utilitarianism or Kant's ethi-
cal writings.
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And again the great defenses of injustice as they appear in Plato's
Gorgias and Republic or perhaps Machiavelli's Prince.
And certainly some attention to anthropology and primitive law; per-
haps Malinowski or Sumner.
Or to change directions once more, perhaps some of the basic defenses of
free speech and tolerance as in Milton, Voltaire, Mill, and perhaps the
censorship in the Republic. Or maybe instead the Frankfurter volume on
the Sacco-Vanzetti case.
Or it might be possible and productive of insight to take a single judge
and actually read through a substantial number of his opinions at one
time.
And I would be in favor of reading one good biography, perhaps the
new Brandeis, to focus on the problem of life at the law. Or, perhaps, to
take Rodell's suggestion, the James Reid Parker short stories about New
York law practice.
And somewhere along the line something from Aristophanes or Rabelais
or Swift which would center on the public relations problems the lawyer
has always had with the rest of mankind.
And Pareto should deserve some serious consideration.
And in any case I'd suggest starting with Plato's small dialogue The
Ion, which although not at all about law raises the central query of what it
is the lawyer should know. And it might be fun to read Rodell's Woe unto
Ye Lawyers at the same time or the recent Lasswell-McDougal piece on
legal education.20
Such listings are obviously endless. There are many other pressing can-
didates from sociology, rhetoric, logic, analytical jurisprudence, etc. Per-
haps a case could even be made out for reading some Blackstone. I hope
that a rough pattern may be clear.
But once again the point is that it is better to read a.few books seriously
and to discuss them seriously than to attempt scholarly coverage of all
the materials.
It will be remembered that the Van Doren scheme emphasized the role
of all the liberal arts in education. Those arts include not only reading
well, listening well, and talking well, but also writing well. It should there-
fore be a part of the current proposal that the student write. A minimum
suggestion would be three serious writing jobs over the year. And there
are rich possibilities for imaginative assignment. The student might care-
fully review one of the modern books, or he might review a modern book
three times during the year. Again, he might review many opinions of a
2ONote 9 supra.
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single judge. Or review an older book-if you read Hobbes in the course,
then he might tackle Locke. Or he might tackle in some detail any one of a
dozen of the darker themes-the relation of law and history, law and psy-
chology, or precedent and statutory construction; or, perhaps best, he
might write a critique of the curriculum itself.
The proposal then amounts to no more and to no less than this: the
senior law student in his last year would spend part of his time reading
some good books, part of his time writing about them, and part of his time
engaging in good c6nversation about them; and the faculty would do the
same.
VI
There remains one central difficulty with what has been said. We-have
been talking about a single course in jurisprudence and not paying any
attention to what the rest of the curriculum may be like. Perhaps any at-
tempt to discuss the design for jurisprudence without co-ordinately dis-
cussing the design for the rest of the curriculum is doomed to failure. Per-
haps the lesson is that we must discuss legal education as a whole if we
are to discuss any part of it intelligently.21
In any event it is clear that the better integrated the curriculum, the
less need there is for separate courses on the general content of law. The
present discussion may, well have sounded as though I were concerned with
the narrower legal curriculum of twenty-five years ago. I realize that all
law schools have been increasingly critical of the content of legal educa-
tion and that they have been translating that criticism into action. Pro-
fessor Beale's mot about making noise like a lawyer is not heard so fre-
quently these days nor is that other joke about going to the divinity
school. And the names of Veblen, Marx, Pareto, Freud, et al., no longer
strike so alien a note when uttered within a law school's walls.
It may be that a proposal such as that outlined will be in competition
with curriculum changes or unduly repetitious of them. Perhaps under the
ideal setup the Marx would be read as part of the course in contracts, the
Freud as part of the criminal law, and perhaps we should concern our-
selves only with the task of designing and redesigning the curriculum un-
til the perfect balance was achieved throughout it of the general and the
special, of the legal and the non-legal, until all good analogies and as-
sumptions had been made explicit. That may be the main job of legal edu-
cation today. But few claim to have achieved such model integration and
articulateness as yet.
2 It is one of the many virtues of the Lasswell-McDougal commentary on legal education
that the authors actually do come to grips with the curriculum as a whole. Note 9 supra.
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It is therefore appropriate to look at this time to the possible help we
may get from the older notions of liberal education. For me the most at-
tractive feature of a general law course designed along such lines is that
it provides a vehicle for participation by the entire law faculty on appro-
priately challenging materials. And it is not clear that any program of in-
tegration can be altogether successful unless there is such participation.
It must be remembered once again that such an approach is not cul-
tural, and that it is radically incomplete and even dangerous unless cou-
pled with a proposal such as that for the research institute.
Perhaps the full analogy for the liberal education approach to juris-
prudence would require that the reading, writing and good talk about law
be kept up throughout the entire legal education and thus run parallel to
the rest of the curriculum for the full three or four years.
Whether you treat such suggestions as merely insurance against the
probable lack of integration of any de facto curriculum, or as something
more, I believe they deserve the-attention of those who are at work fash-
ioning a legal education in which the cross-fire from general to special, le-
gal to non-legal, will be truly effective and through which law will take its
place as the pivotal social science.
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